03 ISSUE IV
MARCH 2025
MARCH 2025
Stripping the sugarcoat from COP 30
The stance of Brazil's government on COP 30 exposes the challenges of advocating for a more equal climate agenda
amid domestic and global tensions.
amid domestic and global tensions.
By Fernanda Rebelato
It is no secret that international events, of any nature, happening inside a local context can move how domestic politics shape a nation's position and opinion in the world. Brazil, especially under Lula’s presidency, is no stranger to that fact. During Lula’s first two terms, Brazil was selected as the host country of both the Summer Olympics (2014) and the FIFA World Cup (2016) under a notorious effort from Lula and his outspoken foreign policy that seeks to ensure Brazil receives the due attention on the world stage.
Those two global events went on to unlock several protests and opinion shifts in public opinion around the massive spending and infrastructure effort that uncovered the structural contradictions and inequalities of Brazilian society and state, including corruption charges against the political parties involved. In his third presidency term starting in 2023, Lula’s government has taken the center role in three multilateral events that reinforce the idea of a rising protagonist: both the G20 and BRICS presidency and the opportunity to host COP 30 (officially, the 30th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Belém do Pará for ten days in November, a city placed at the heart of the Amazon forest that seems to ground the concept of recentering climate discussions.
In Lula’s own words during COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in 2022: “Brazil is back.”
The foreign policy for Lula’s third term shows signs of continuity with the historical leadership position pursued by former terms but also inaugurates a new set of agendas that translate the current global debates. The inauguration speech of the foreign minister, Mauro Vieira, emphasized the importance of restoring Brazil's place in international relations, especially on issues such as climate change, humanitarian cooperation, and strengthening global institutions. In the discourse, an interesting focus is recognizing the country's strategic position in global food security, seeking to open markets and reduce barriers to agricultural trade.
This position might seem contradictory to an inattentive observer who questions how a climate change focus could exist in the same strategy as a push for agricultural trade, one of the main drivers of deforestation in Brazil. It is one example of official public discourse over the central negotiation positions of the country’s climate leadership. The G20 Heads of State Summit highlighted Brazil’s priorities of reducing social inequalities, promoting sustainable development, and reforming global governance, with a particular emphasis on climate financing and significant progress on advancing a global tax.
In interviews about the G20 and Brazil’s current foreign policy, Lula has highlighted the opportunity of gathering heads of state around one cause and the lucrative payoffs from expanding trade: “Without foreign policy, you don’t increase trade, you don't increase your relationships, you don't make more friends.”
This understanding of foreign policy and global negotiations sheds light on a key aspect of Brazilian domestic policy in the run-up to COP 30. As with other foreign policy issues, it highlights Brazil’s contradictions in attempting to position itself as a global climate leader while simultaneously advocating for oil exploration in sensitive areas like the Foz do Amazonas Basin, located offshore of the states of Amapá and Pará in the far north of Brazil. The debate over oil exploration in the Foz do Amazonas basin has been a longstanding point of contention between the government, the state-run oil company Petrobras, environmentalists, and other technical agencies for over a decade. The issue gained renewed attention when the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), a federal agency under the Ministry of Environment, denied Petrobras's drilling license in a technical report released in 2023.
Due to its support for fossil fuel exploration, Lula’s government has faced criticism from environmentalists, resistance, and political turmoil from within its political base. This stance is closely aligned with the belief that economic development is essential. Lula has asserted that “we cannot give up a source of wealth.” According to Lula and his advisors, there is no contradiction between Brazil’s desire to access oil revenue and its commitment to the energy transition.
Naturally, the debate gained momentum due to activists' and environmentalists' efforts to highlight the catastrophic risks oil exploration poses to a fragile ecosystem. When asked about the conflictual position, Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, President of COP30, highlighted how several countries consider fossil fuel exploration a path towards a net zero emission plan in 2050 and cemented the need for developing countries to finance their energy transitions.
This dual stance reveals the complexity of developing a single global climate agenda between North and South countries. By consistently underscoring the pressing economic needs of Global South nations and calling out the hypocrisies of wealthier countries, Lula’s government can position itself as an advocate for a pragmatic and reparational approach to climate action, particularly concerning the redistribution of financial resources. However, this approach risks backfiring if Brazil is perceived as using the global stage to assert leadership while neglecting domestic challenges, ultimately losing sight of the urgent and tangible actions the current climate crisis demands.
How the government position will perform under the domestic and international pressure that lies in such an event remains to be seen in November. One aspect we can already visualize is the pragmatic vision brought by André do Lago to not shy away from hard conversations that show the reflections of a country accustomed to having its contradictions revealed:
“We invite the world to the center of our biggest climate change problem. This is a political act of transparency that few countries would do. We are inviting people to come to the region that represents all these challenges for Brazil. COP30 is not a public relations operation.”
When Lula’s current term ends in 2027, he will be 81 years old and as of now lacks a clear successor. Brazilian democracy remains deeply polarized, with progress often relying on coalition-building and questionable compromises to move forward. While there is strength in confronting hard truths, achieving a genuine shift toward a global climate agenda that centers the Global South demands a long-term commitment and unwavering dedication to social participation — both of which remain lacking in Brazil’s domestic and foreign policy. Such a transformation appears unlikely to be reached by a single leader or within the span of a single presidential term.
Fernanda Rebelato is an MA candidate in International Affairs